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HEARSAY: PART II
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
This is the second of a series of articles on the hearsay
rule. The first article discussed the definition of hearsay.
This article examines a number of hearsay exceptions.
Ohio Evidence Rule 803 specifies twenty-two hearsay
exceptions. Rule 804 recognizes five additional exceptions. In contrast to the exceptions enumerated in Rule
804, the Rule 803 exceptions do not depend on the
unavailability of the declarant.
Rule 803 changed prior Ohio law in a number of
respects. These changes are discussed in connection
with the specific exceptions to which they relate. The rule
also differs from Federal Rule 803. These differences are
also discussed in connection with specific exceptions.
Two exceptions recognized in Federal Rule 803 were not
adopted in Ohio. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(18) (learned treatise exception); Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) (residual exception).
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evidence. The necessity is not so great; perhaps hardly a
necessity, only an expediency or convenience, can be
predicated." /d. § 1421, at 253.
Wigmore explained the guarantee of trustworthiness
consideration as follows: "The second principle which,
combined with the first [necessity], satisfies us to accept
the evidence untested is in the nature of a practicable
substitute for the ordinary test of cross-examination. We
see that under certain circumstances the probability of
accuracy and trustworthiness of statements is practically
sufficient, ifnot quite equivalent to that of statements
tested in the variety of circumstances sanctioned by judicial practice; and it is usually from one of these salient
circumstances that the exception takes its name." /d. §
1422, at 253.
FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION RULES

HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: UNDERLYING THEORY
The hearsay exceptions recognized in Rules 803 and
804 are based on some circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that is thought to warrant admissibility
notwithstanding the lack of cross-examination, oath, and
personal appearance of the declarant. In some cases, an
exception is also supported by a necessity argument.
Wigmore argued that all exceptions were based on these
two considerations - "a circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness and a necessity, for the evidence." 5
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1420, at 251 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
The necessity principle is clearly present in the exceptions specified in Rule 804, because the unavailability of
the declarant is required as a condition of admissibility.
The Rule 803 exceptions, however, also may be justified
upon a modified necessity argument, that is, the hearsay
statement is thought to be superior to the declarant's trial
testimony. Wigmore explained this consideration as
follows: "The assertion may be such that we cannot
expect, again, or at this time, to get evidence ofthe same
value from the same or other sources. This appears more
or less fully in the exception for spontaneous declarations, for reputation, and in part elsewhere. Here we are
not threatened: .. with the entire loss of a person's
evidence, but merely of some valuable source of

Several hearsay exceptions specifically require firsthand knowledge on the part of the declarant. E.g, Rules
803(5) and (6). For other exceptions, firsthand knowledge
is not explicitly required. Nevertheless, firsthand knowledge is a requirement for all exceptions. This has been
the traditional view. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1424
(Chadbourn rev. 1974). The Advisory Committee's Note to
Federal Rule 803 reads: "In a hearsay situation, the
declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule
nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand
knowledge. It may appear from his statement or be inferable from circumstances. See Rule 602."
PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS
Rule 803(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for present
sense impressions. The rule requires: (1) statement
describing or explaining an event or condition, (2) about
which the declarant had firsthand knowledge, (3) made
at the time the declarant was perceiving the event or
immediately thereafter, (4) under circumstances that do
not indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The present sense
impression exception was not recognized. under prior
Ohio law, although statements that fall within this exception may have been admitted as res gestae.
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The reliability of present sense impressions rests upon
the d~clarant's lack of time to fabricate. In the leading
case, ljQ!J~!QO pxygen Co., Inc. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161
S.W.2d 474 (1942), the court held that the statement was
"sufficiently spontaneous to save it from the suspicion of
being manufactured evidence. There was no time for a
calculated statement." /d. at 6. The Advisory Committee's
Note to Fed~ral Rule 803 states: "The underlying theory
of Exception (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of
event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate
or consciousmil;;representation." In addition, the time
require,ment :...._ "substantial contemporaneity" eliminates any problem associated with defects in the
declarant's ability to remember the event.
This theory of admissibility differs from the theory
which' underlies the excited utterance exception recognized in Rule 803(2). The reliability of excited utterances
is based upon the declarant's Jack of capacity to fabricate. This difference in theory explains the differences
between the requirements for the two exceptions. For
example;:ast<irtling or exciting event is required for the
excited utterance but not the present sense impression
exception: Other differences are discussed below.
Frequently, however, a statement will satisfy the requirements of both exceptions.

(1958), cited in the Note, illustrates the difference
between the two exceptions. In that case the statement of
a driver who was involved in an accident was admitted as
an excited utterance. The statement revealed that the
driver was acting as an agent at the time of the 1ccident.
This statement would not qualify as a present &ense
impression because it does not explain or describe the
event. The statement did qualify as an excited utterance
because it "related" to the event.

Circumstances of lack of trustworthiness
__ l.nQ.QD!rast t() Federal Rule 803(1}, the Ohio rule
expTiclffy permHs-the exclusion of a statement that would
otherwise_. qualify as a present sense impression if the
"circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness." ldenticalphrases appear in the business records and public
records exceptions. See Rule 803(6) and (8}. See also
Fla. Stat. Ann. Evid. Code§ 90.803(1}.
One of the g·uarantees of trustworthiness upon which
the present sense impression exception is based is verification. For example, the following statement appears in
the second edition of McCormick: "the statement will
usually have been made to a third party (the person who
subsequently testifies to it) who, being present at the
time and scene of the observation, will usually have an
opportunity to observe the situation himself and thus
provide a check on the accuracy of the declarant's statement." McCormick, Evidence 710 (2d ed. 1972). But if the
witness (the third party) heard the statement but did not
perceive the event, this safeguard is not present. The
"lack of trustworthiness" clause was intended to protect
against this possibility. The Staff Note contains the
following commentary:
One of the principal elements of the circumstantial
guaranty oftrustworthiness of this exception is that the
statement was made at a time and under circumstances in which the person to whom the statement
was made would be in a position to verify the statement. The provision requiring exclusion if the circumstances do not warrant a high degree of
trustworthiness would justify exclusion if, for example,
the statement were made by a declarant concerning a
perceived event to another by way of a C. B. radio
transmission. Other circumstances other than the lack
of verification may also taint the trustworthiness of this
class of hearsay declaration.
The latest edition of McCormick, however, argues that
the verification requirement is not necessary. McCormick, Evidence§ 198, at 862 (3d ed. 1984).

Time requirement
Rule B03(1) requires the statement be made "while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immeqiately thereafter." The statement must be nearly
contemporaneous with the perception of the event. This
requirement is more restrictive than the time requirement
for-excited-utterances. An excited utterance could be
mac:le--mirlUtes (sometimes hours) after the exciting
event;_qQ lpng ;3.s the declarantis under:.theJnfluence of
the excitenientcaused by the event at the time the statement is made. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal
Rule l303 provides the following explanation: "With
respect to the time element, Exception (1) recognizes that
in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity
is not pQ~sible, and hence a slight lapse is allowable.
Under Exception (2) [excited utterances] the standard of
measurememt is the duration of the state of excitement."

Subject matter requirement
The rule requires that the statement describe or
explain an event or condition.Thisrequirement follows
from the theory underlying the exception - lack of time
to fabricate. Statements beyond descriptions or explanations indicate that the declarant has had sufficient time to
think
event. In contrast, the subject matter of
an excited utterance is not so circumscribed - statements "relating to a starling event" are admissible.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 803
states: "Permissible subject matter of the statement is
limited under Exception (1) to description or explanation
of the event or condition, the assumption being that
spontaneity, in the absence of a startling event, may
extend no farther. In Exception (2) [excited utterances],
however, the statement need only 'relate' to the startling
event or condition, thus affording a broader scope of
subject matter coverage." Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball,
249 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932

abouithe

EXCITED UTTERANCES
Rule 803(2) recognizes a hearsay exception for excited
utterances. The rule requires: (1} a startling event; (2} a
statement relating to that event; (3) made by a declarant
with firsthand knowledge; and (4) made while the declarant was under the stress of the excitement caused by the
event.
The excited utterance exception had been recognized
in the prior Ohio cases, although rarely by that name.
The early cases treat such statements as res gestae. See
New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Kovatch, 120
Ohio St. 532, 166 N.E. 582 (1929); State v. Lasecki, 90
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Ohio St. 10, 106 N.E. 660 (1914). Later cases use the term
"spontaneous exclamations." See State v. Price, 60 Ohio
St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
943 (1980).
The reliability of excited utterances rests upon the
declarant's lack of capacity to fabricate. "The theory of
Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce
a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the
capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of
conscious fabrication." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed.
R. Evid. 803. The Note also recognizes the principal criticism of the exception- "That excitement impairs
accuracy of observation as well as eliminating conscious
fabrication." /d. The trial court determines the admissibility of excited utterances-under Rule 104(a)and is accorded wide discretion in this determination. State v. Rohdes,
23 Ohio St.3d 225, 229, 492 N.E.2d 430 (1986).
Startling event requirement
The rule requires that the statement relate to a "startling event or condition." This requirement follows from
the theory underlying the exception; without a startling
event, the declarant's capacity to reflect and fabricate will
not be suspended. In State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215,
373 N.E.2d 1234 (1978), the Supreme Court stated the
requirement as follows: "[T]here [must be] some occurrence startling enough to produce a nervous excitement
in the declarant, which was sufficient to still his reflective
faculties and thereby make his statements and declarations the unreflective and sincere expression of his actual impressions and beliefs ..." /d. (syllabus, para. 1);
accord, Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140
(1955); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Kovatch, 120 Ohio St. 532, 166 N.E. 682 (1920).
The declarant may be a participant in the event - for
example, the victim of an assault or the driver of a vehicle
involved in an automobile accident. The declarant may
also be a bystander. See New York, Chicago & St. Louis
R.R. Co. v. Kovatch, supra; State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10,
106 N.E. 660 (1914); Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 803 ("Participation by the declarant is not required.").
If the bystander-declarant is unidentified, admissibility
of the statement requires close scrutiny. The federal
drafters recognized this problem. "[W)hen declarant is
an unidentified bystander, the cases indicate hesitancy in
upholding the statement alone as sufficient, ... a result
which would under appropriate circumstances be consistent with the rule." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 803. See also New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R.
Co. v. Kovatch, supra (unidentified bystander's statement
admitted).
Proof of the startling event may consist of extrinsic
evidence of the event, including the condition of the
declarant. In addition, the utterance itself may establish
the existence of a startling event. See McCormick,
Evidence§ 297 (3d ed. 1984). Consideration of the statement itself for this purpose is permissible because under
Rule 104(A) "the judge is not limited by the hearsay rule
in passing upon preliminary questions of fact." Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803.

"while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition." This requirement
follows from the theory underlying the exception; unless
the declarant is speaking while under the influence of the
event, his capacity to reflect and fabricate will not be
suspended.
The federal drafters refer to this requirement as the
"time element." "Under Exception (2) the standard of
measurement is the duration of the state of excitement.
'How long can excitement prevail? Obviously there are
no pat answers and the character of the transaction or
event will largely determine the significance of the time
factor.' Slough, Spontaneous Statement and State of
Mind, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 224, 243 (1961) ..."Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. In State v. Boston,
46 Ohio St.3d 108, 545 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), the Supreme
Court commented: "[TJhe lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement is not dispositive in the application of Evid. R. 803(2). Rather, the
question is whether the declarant is still under the stress
of nervous excitement from the event." /d. at 118.
In State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215,373 N.E.2d 1234
(1978), the Supreme Court stated the requirement as
follows: "[T]he statement or declaration, even if not strictly contemporaneous with the exciting cause, [must be]
made before there has been time for such nervous
excitement to lose a domination over [the declarant's) ·
reflective faculties, so that such domination continued to
remain sufficient to make his statements and declarations the unreflective and sincere expression of his actual impressions and beliefs .. ."/d. (syllabus, para 1);
accord, Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140
(1955); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Kovatch, 120 Ohio St. 532, 166 N.E. 682 (1929); State v.
Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10, 106 N.E. 660 (1914).
Hence, statements made after a substantial time has
elapsed may be admissible so long as the declarant
remained under the influence of the exciting event when
the statement was made. See State v. Duncan, supra;
McCormick, Evidence§ 297 (3d ed. 1984). In State v.
Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 466 (1988), the
statement was made 15 hours after the event, during
which time the declarant was unconscious. The Court
held the statement admissible.
A statement made in response to a question may also
fit within this exception. See State v. Duncan, supra;
State v. Dickerson, 51 Ohio App.2d 255,367 N.E.2d 927
(1977); Bergfeld v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R.
Co., 103 Ohio App. 87, 144 N.E.2d 483 (1956). In State v.
Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 466 (1988), the
Court ruled
that the admission of a declaration as an excited utterance is not precluded by questioning which: (1) is
neither coercive nor leading, (2) facilitates the declarant's expression of what is already the natural focus of
the declarant's thoughts, and (3) does not destroy the
domination of the nervous excitement over the declarant's reflective faculties. /d. at 93.
Subject matter requirement
The rule requires that the statement "relate" to a startling event. See State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215, 373
N.E.2d 1234 (1978); Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124

Under the stress of excitement requirement
The rule requires that the statement have been made
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N.E.2d 140 (1955). This requirement is simply a refinement of the "under the stress of the excitement" require- ·
ment discussed previously. Statements that do not
"relate" to the starting event indicate that the declarant is
no longer speaking while under the influence of the
event. In Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508
(D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958), the
court explained: "[A]s soon as the excited utterance goes
beyond description of the exciting event and deals with
past facts or with the future it may tend to take on a
reflective quality ... In other words, the very fact that the
utterance is not descriptive of the exciting event is one of
the factors which the trial court must take into account in
the evaluation of whether the statement is truly a spontaneous, impulsive expression excited by the event." /d.
at 511.
Firsthand Knowledge
The firsthand knowledge rule applies to excited utterances. See State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215, 373
N.E.2d 1234 (1978); Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124
N.E.2d 140 (1955); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R.
Co. v. Kovatch, 120 Ohio St. 532, 540, 166 N.E. 682, 684
(1929) (opportunity to observe inferred from circumstances); State v. Moorman, 7 Ohio App.3d 251, 455
N.E.2d 495 (Hamilton 1982) (personal knowledge may be
"inferred"}; McCormick, Evidence§ 297, at 858 (3d ed.
1984) ("Direct proof is not necessary; if the circumstances appear consistent with opportunity [to observe]
by the declarant, this is sufficient.").

23 Ohio St.3d 225, 228, 492 N.E.2d 430 (1986).

STATEMENTS OF PHYSICAl CONDITION OR MIND
Rule 803(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for statements of a declarant's "then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health) ..." The rule explicitly excludes statements "of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms, of declarant's will." Many of the
prior Ohio casescfteated sfa,tements falling within this
exception as partpf the vague res gestae rule.
For purposes of analysis, the subject matter of Rule
803(3) is divided into fourcategories: (1) statements of
presently existing physical condition, (2) statements of
presently existing state of mind offered to prove that state
of mind, (3) statements of presently existing state of mind
offered to prove t~edeclarant acted in accordance with
that state of mind,cand (4) statements of memory or belief
offered to prove the fact remembered or believed.
Presently existing physical condition
Statements of presently existing physical condition or
sensation, including statements of "pain" and "bodily
health," are admissible under Rule 803(3). The critical
requirement is thatthe statement relate to a present
condition and not fa· past conditions, pains, or symptoms.
The statement must be contemporaneous with the condition, not the everit which caused the condition. Statements of past physical conditions are governed by Rule
803(4), which requires thatsuch statements be made for
the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis. This
requirementis"noHoundincRule803(3); a statement of
present physical condition may be made to any person
for any reason. Rules 803(3) and 803(4) overlap somewhat because the latter rule also covers statements of
present physical conditions made for the purpose of
medical treatment or diagnosis.
The reliability of statements of presently existing physical condition rests on the spontaneity of the statement,
which reduces the risk of conscious fabrication. See
McCormick, Eyideo_ce § 291, at 838 (3d ed. 1986). In
addition, this exception is justified on a necessity argument. "Being spontaneous, they are considered of greater probative value than the present testimony of the
declarant." /d. See also 6 Wigmore, Evidence§ 1714
(Chadbourn rev. 1976).
The few prior Ohio cases on this issue are not consistent. In Stough v. Industrial Comm., 148 Ohio St. 415, 75
N.E.2d 441 (1947), the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a statement, "He said he had a headache," on
the theory that the statement was part of the res gestae.
In Smith v. Young, 109 Ohio App. 463, 168 N.E.2d 3
(1958), the court excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's
wife "to the effect that she had heard plaintiff complain of
pain in his chest." !d. at 470. The court held the statement
inadmissible hearsay and self-serving. The result in this
case would be different under Rule 803(3), which does
not exclude statements merely because they are selfserving. See McCormick, Evidence§ 290 (3d ed. 1984).

Competency
Rules relating to the competency of witnesses (Rule
601), have not been applied to excited utterances. See
McCormick, Evidence§ 297 (3d ed. 1984}. Most of the
Ohio cases have involved the statements of a young
child. E.g., State v. Duncan, supra (six year old child);
New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Kovatch, supra
(five year old child); State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10, 106
N.E. 660 (1914) (four year old child). In State v. Wallace,
37 Ohio St.3d 87, 524 N.E. 466 (1988), the Court ruled
"that the inability to establish the competency of a child
declarant does not affect the admissibility of the declarations for purposes of Evid. R. 803(2)." /d. at 88.
Opinion Rule
In Neisner Brothers, Inc. v. Schafer, 124 Ohio St. 311,
178 N.E. 269 (1931), the Supreme Court excluded an
excited utterance because the utterance violated the
opinion rule. McCormick criticized this case. "Where the
declarant is an in-court witness, it is probably appropriate
to require him to testify in concrete terms rather than
conclusory generalizations. But in every day life people
often talk in conclusory terms and when these statements are later offered in court there is no opportunity to
require the declarant to substitute more specific
language. Here, as elsewhere, the opinion rule should be
applied sparingly, if at all, to out-of-court speech."
McCormick, Evidence 859 and n. 40 (3d ed. 1984).
Moreover, in a later case the Court ruled that an excited utterance was not inadmissible because it was in the
form of a conclusion- that the declarant had just seen
her boss "murdered" for "no reason." State v. Rohdes,
4
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This rule poses the problem of whether statements
admissible under the rule may be offered to prove that a
person other than the declarant also engaged in the
intended conduct- for example, that Hillman accompanied the declarant to Crooked Creek. The House Judiciary Committee Report attempted to limit the rule in this
respect: "[T]he Committee intends that the Rule be
construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hillman ... so as to render statements of intent by
a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct,
not the future conduct of another person." H.R. Rep. No.
650, 93rd Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974) U.S.
Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7087. Some federal cases,
however, have admitted such statements. United States
v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom, lnciso v. United States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). But
see United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d
Cir. 1987).

Statements of presently existing state of mind
Statements of presently existing state of mind or
emotion, including statements of "intent, plan, motive,
design, [or) mental feeling," are admissible under Rule
803(3). A person's state of mind is often a consequential
or material fact under the substantive law.
This exception rests on the same reliability rationale as
statements of presently existing physical condition, i.e.,
the spontaneity of the statement reduces the risk of
conscious fabrication. See McCormick, Evidence§ 294
(3d ed. 1984). In addition, the exception is supported by a
necessity argument; in most cases, the statement is
more probative of state of mind than later trial testimony.
Frequently, statements regarding the mental state of
the declarant are not hearsay because they are not
offered to prove the truth of the assertion contained in the
statement. For example, a declarant's statement, "I will
kill John Doe," offered to prove intent in a homicide
prosecution, is hearsay but falls with the exception of
Rule 803(3). The statement, ':John Doe is the most
despicable person I know," offered to prove intent, is not
offered to prove the truth of the assertion and is, therefore, not hearsay.
See State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 514
N.E.2d 394 (1987) (declarant's statement that she was
"fearful" and "apprehensive" admitted); State v. Sage,
31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987) (declarant's statement that she intended to "break up" with
defendant admitted).

Statements of remembrance
Statements of "memory or belief [offered] to prove the
fact remembered or believed" are inadmissible unless
the statement relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will." The federal
drafters explained this limitation: 'The exclusion of 'statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered
or believed' is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction
of the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from
allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement,
to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of
the event which produced the state of mind." Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. See also Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); McCormick, Evidence
§ 296 (3d ed. 1984).

State of mind offered to prove future conduct
Statements of presently existing state of mind are
admissible under Rule 803(3) to prove that the declarant
subsequently acted in accordance with that state of
mind. For example, a declarant's statement, "I will kill
John Doe," is admissible to prove that the declarant
killed Doe as well as to prove his intent to kill. Such statements are less reliable proof of further conduct than of
present intent because people frequently do not or
cannot carry out their intentions. As McCormick notes,
the problem "becomes one of relevancy." McCormick,
Evidence § 295, at 846 (3d ed. 1984).
The leading case on this point is Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285 (1892), where letters in which
the declarant stated that he intended to travel from Wichita to Crooked Creek with another person (Hillman) were
offered in evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court held the
letters admissible:
The letters ... were competent not as narratives of
facts communicated to the writer by others, nor yet as
proof that he actually went away from Wichita, but as
evidence that, shortly before the time when other
evidence tended to show that he went away, he had
the intention of going, and of going with Hillman,
which made it more probable both that he did go and
that he went with Hillman, than if there had been no
proof of such intention. /d. at 295-96.
Prior Ohio cases recognizing this exception have been
decided as res gestae cases. See Outland v. Industrial
' Comm., 136 Ohio St. 488, 26 N.E.2d 760 (1940); Railway
Co. v. Herrick, 49 Ohio St. 25, 29 N.E. 1052 (1892); Finnegan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 81 Abs. 417, 162
N.E.2d 216 (App. 1958).

STATEMENTS OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT
Rule 803(4) recognizes a hearsay exception for statements "made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."
Such statements are often part of a hospital or medical
record and thus may present double hearsay problems.
See Rule 805 (multiple hearsay).
Stateme11ts made for treatment
The reliability of statements made for the purpose of
medical treatment, including past symptoms and pain,
rests on the theory that the declarant would not fabricate
under these circumstances because the effectiveness of
the treatment depends on the accuracy of the statement.
See McCormick, Evidence§ 292 (3d ed. 1988). In Pennsylvania Co. v. Files, 65 Ohio St. 403, 62 N.E. 1047 (1901),
the Supreme Court stated: "It is to be presumed in such
case, that he states the truth, as it is to his interest that he
should do so, and not mislead the physician by false
statements as to his condition. He is under a strong
motive in such case to state the truth, and it is on this
ground that such evidence is admitted." /d. at 406;
accord, Baker v. Industrial Comm., 44 Ohio App. 539,
186 N.E. 10 (1933); Cunningham v. Ward Baki11g Co., 28
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Abs. 111 (App. 1938); Hartley v. Model Dairy Products
Co,, 25Abs.146 (App. 1937). ·

statement that he was struck by an automobile would
qualify but not his statement that the car was driven
through a red light." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 803. See also McQueen v. Goldey, 20 Ohio App.3d
41, 43,484 N.E.2d 712 (1984) (statements in hospital
record concerning manner in which accident happened
excluded); Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App.2d 297, 253
N.E.2d 804 {1969) (opinion of lack of fault in hospital
record excluded).

Statements made for diagnosis
Rule 803(4) is not limited to statements made for the
purpose of medical treatment. It also covers statements
made for the purpose of diagnosis, i.e., statements made
to a physician solely for the purpose of presenting expert
testimony at trial. Such statements were not admissible
under prior Ohio law. See Pennsylvania Co. v. Files, 65
Ohio St. 403, 62 N.E. 1047 (1901); Lidyard v. General
Fireproofing Co., 62 Ohio App. 500, 24 N.E.2d 635
(1939).
.
.. .
.. . ·..
This part of the rule does not rest on any special guaranteeof trustworthiness, but rathE)r (Jn a pragmatic
assessment of the use of expert testimony at trial. A
physician, consulted only for the purpose of testifying as
an expert, may state an opinion; the opinion is often
based, in part, on medical history provided by the
patient. Although the medical history was not admissible
as substantive evidence under prior law, it was admissible to show the basis of the expert's opinion. See DiMarzo v. Columbus Transit Co., 100 Ohio App. 521, 137
N.E.2d 766 (1955) (patient informed physician she "had
been injured in a bus accident."); ct. Scott v. Campbell,
115 Ohio App. 208, 184 N.E.2d 485 {1961) (patient
informed physician she had suffered a "blow to her
knee."). The federal drafters concluded that the distinction was too difficult for a jury to appreciate:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only
for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While
thes.e statements were. not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the
basis of his opinion, including statements of this
most
kind. The distinction thils.cailed.forwas
unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly
rejects the limitation. Advisory Committee's Note,
Fed. R. Evid. 803.

Child Sexual Abuse Cases
In State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 545 N.E.2d 1220
(1989)~Jhe0hio Supreme Court questioned the applicaoility ofthis exception in a child sexual abuse case. The
court questioned whether a young child would be motivated to make statements for the purpose of medical
treatment. "The reason is that we really know that such a
young child is not giving the doctor the information for
the purposes required by Evid. R. 803(4). More than likely, the child does not even want to be seeing the doctor!"
!d. at 122. The Court also questioned whether the exception covered a child's statement identifying the abuser.
The Court went on to specify the conditions under
which such statements would satisfy both the requirements of Rule 803(4) and the Confrontation Clause:
Where a child is either available or unavailable and
the child declarant's out-of-court statements meet the
rationale and policy of a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule, such as Evid. R. 803(4), and it is demonstrated that a good-faith effort has been made to
produce the non-testifying declarant, the out-of-court
statements are admissible through a third person. The
statements, however, must have an "indicia of reliability" and factors such as the age of the child, the presence of corroborative physical evidence, the
relationship of the victim to the accused, the child's
relationship to the persons to whom the statements
are made, and the terminology used by the child are to
be used in determining reliability. /d. at 127.
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Other requirements
Although the rule requires the statement be made for
medical diagnosis or treatment, the statement need not
be made to a physician. "Statements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family
might be included." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 803.
The rule is limited to statements that describe "medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause
or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." The provision relating to
"causes" represents a change in Ohio law. For example,
in Dugan v. Industrial Comm., 135 Ohio St. 652, 22
N.E.2d 132 (1939), the Supreme Court had held that "a
physician will not be permitted to testify as to statements
made by his patient relative to the cause of the claimed
injury, when such statements were not spontaneous but
were self-serving declarations and in the nature of a
narrative of a past event." !d. at 655.
Statements relating to the cause of an injury, however,
do not include statements of fault. "Thus a patient's

RECORDED RECOLLECTION
Rule 803(5) recognizes a hearsay exception for past
recollection recorded. The rule requires that: (1) the
witness had firsthand knowledge of a matter; (2) the
witness made or adopted a memorandum or record
concerning the matter "when the matter was fresh in
his memory"; (3) the memorandum or record reflects
the witness' "knowledge correctly"; and (4) thewitness has "insufficient recollection to enable him to
testify fully and accurately" about the matter recorded.
The exception for past recollection recorded should
be distinguished from the practice of refreshing
recollection, which does not involve hearsay evidence
and is governed by Rule 612. In some cases a
memorandum qualifying as recorded recollection
under Rule 803(5) will itself contain hearsay. In such a
case admissibility is governed by Rule 805 (multiple
hearsay).
The trustworthiness of records of past recollection
"is found in the reliability inherent in a record made
while events were still fresh in mind and accurately
6

enable him to testify "fully and accurately" at trial.
This requirement is consistent with State v. Scott, 31
Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344 (1972), in which the
Supreme Court required that the witness "lack[ ) a
complete present recollection of the event ..." /d.
(syllabus, para. 1).
The "insufficient recollection" requirement does not
relate to the accuracy of the record or memorandum.
Rather, it is aimed at avoiding abuse of the exception.
"[T]he absence of the requirement, it is believed,
would encourage the use of statements carefully
prepared for purposes of litigation under the supervision of attorneys, investigators, or claim adjusters."
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803.

reflecting them." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 803. The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law.
See State v. Scott, 31 Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344
#(1972); Moots v. State, 21 Ohio St. 653 (1871) (business
· records); Ronald v. Young, 117 Ohio App. 362, 187
N.E.2d 74 (1963) (business record).
Preparation of the record
The rule require& the record or memorandum "to
have been made or adopted (by the witness] when the
matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect (his]
knowledge correctly." These requirements relating to
the preparation of the record are designed to ensure
the reliability of the matters contained in the record.
In State v. Scott, 31 Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the record had to
have been made "at or near the time of the event." /d.
(syllabus, para. 1). In contrast, the rule requires that
the record have been prepared "when the matter was
fresh in [the witness'] memory." This formulation
follows Wigmore's view. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence
§745 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Wigmore argued that the
"at or near the time" requirement was too restrictive
and arbitrary. !d. "No precise formula can be applied
to determine whether this test has been met; perhaps
the best rule of thumb is that the requirement is not
met if the time lapse is such, under the circumstances,
as to suggest that the writing is not likely to be
accurate." McCormick, Evidence 714 (2d ed. 1972).
The rule provides that the record may be either
1
~ epared or adopted by the witness so long as the
· vv1tness vouches that the record reflects his "knowledge correctly." If the witness makes a statement to a
third person who prepares a record, the record is
admissible if the witness verified the accuracy of the
record at a time when the event was fresh in his
memory. Even if the witness did not verify the record,
the record may be admissible if the recorder testifies
that the record contains an accurate account of the
witness' statement. This situation involves what
McCormick refers to as "cooperative records." McCormick, Evidence§ 303 (3d ed. 1984), citing Rathbun v.
Brancatella, 93 N.J.L. 222, 107 A. 279 (1919). The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 803 indicates
that cooperative records are admissible under the
rule: "Multiple person involvement in the process of
observing and recording, as in Rathbun v. Brancatella, ... is entirely consistent with the exception."
Rule 803(5) differs from its federal counterpart in
one respect. The Ohio rule requires that the accuracy
of the record be established "by the testimony of the
witness," a requirement not explicitly stated in the
federal rule. This amendment was intended to avoid
the suggestion in United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974), that
the accuracy of the record could be established
through the testimony of a third person, even though
the witness could not recall making the statement
"·ecorded.

Use of the record or memorandum at trial
Rule 803(5) provides that if a record qualifies as
recorded recollection, "the memorandum or record
may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party."
The purpose of this provision is to avoid the risk that
the record will be given undue weight. This point was
made in the dissenting opinion in State v. Scott, 31
Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344 (1972): "(A]dmitting the
written paper as evidence results in it going to the deliberation room with the jury and a patent danger is that
it will be given undue weight by the jury ..."/d. at 12.

II

Insufficient recollection
The rule requires that the witness have "insufficient
recollection" of the matter contained in the record to

Jl
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